[Vol. 154: 1331 historians and other Justices, leave no doubt as to the profound effect of Earl Warren in bringing about these results. 6 How should William Rehnquist be assessed as Chief Justice? More specifically, to what extent did the decisions of the Rehnquist Court reflect the views of its Chief Justice? That is the focus of this Article.
At the outset, I need to admit to all of the problems in even engaging in this inquiry. First, it is problematic to assess history that is so recent. The last Term of the Rehnquist Court ended on June 27, 2005, and an academic conference in November 2005 provides only the chance for immediate reflections on an era that has just ended. Certainly, one measure of effectiveness is in bringing about enduring changes in the law. At this point, there can be nothing except guesses and speculation as to which aspects of the Rehnquist Court's decisions will survive and provide a framework for future rulings and which will be overruled or relegated to constitutional footnotes. 7 Second, focusing on the Court's decisions does not assess all of the other ways in which a Chief Justice influences the Court and the judicial system. For example, a key role of the Chief is in the operation of the Supreme Court, including its efficiency and its collegiality. From everything that is known so far, William Rehnquist likely will be regarded as an excellent Chief in these tasks. 8 One of the most important developments during the time Rehnquist was Chief Justice was a dramatic decrease in the size of the Supreme Court's docket. The Court handed down 164 written opinions in Rehnquist's first year as 6 See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939 -1975 an Associate Justice, 9 but only seventy-nine opinions in his last Term.
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I doubt that anyone would deny that this reflects Rehnquist's influence.
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The Chief Justice also is responsible for overseeing the Judicial Conference of the United States, the important rules committees, and other aspects of the federal judiciary, including making appointments to some specialized courts and committees. Although all of this is important, none of it is my focus.
Third, it must be recognized that the success, or lack of it, in implementing a substantive vision may have nothing to do with the Chief Justice's effectiveness. Imagine that Michael Dukakis had won the 1988 presidential election and had appointed the successors to William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. Without Clarence Thomas as a fifth vote in so many cases, countless decisions implementing Rehnquist's views almost surely would have come out differently. 12 Rehnquist likely would have been far less successful substantively, but not because of anything to do with his skills or effectiveness.
Fourth, the quantity of cases makes overall assessments inherently questionable. Rehnquist served as Chief Justice from 1986 to 2005. Over those nineteen Terms, the Supreme Court decided thousands of cases. It is possible to find examples to support any conclusion. Care must be taken to avoid "law-office history"-picking cases from the historical record to support preconceived conclusions. [Vol. 154: 1331 Although I admit to all of these problems, 14 I still believe it is worth offering an initial assessment of William Rehnquist's substantive success as Chief Justice. My overall conclusion is that Rehnquist was enormously successful in that the Supreme Court during his tenure accepted his views in almost every area of law. In some high profile areas, the Court did not go as far as Rehnquist wanted. The Court did not overrule abortion rights, but it did abandon the use of strict scrutiny and provided more deference to government regulation of abortions. 15 The Court did not eliminate all affirmative action, 16 but it did adopt strict scrutiny as the test for racial classifications benefiting minorities. 17 The Rehnquist Court did not overrule the test for the Establishment Clause put forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 18 but it did allow much more government aid to parochial schools.
19
In explaining my assessment of the Rehnquist Court, this Article is divided into two parts. Part I argues that it is a mistake to think of the Rehnquist Court as if it were the same throughout the tenure of the Chief Justice. Rather, I believe that there were three distinct phases of the Rehnquist Court and that Rehnquist's success in achieving his substantive vision varied over time. Part II then looks at the specific areas of constitutional law and suggests that in every major area, 14 Yet another problem is in determining the vision of the Chief Justice. Although a Chief Justice's views can be determined from her opinions, there is no way to know the priorities that a Chief Justice placed on the various areas of law. 15 18 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (stating that a statute "must have a secular legislative purpose," that its "primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion" and that it does not "foster an excessive government entanglement with religion" (internal quotation marks omitted) The Court's lack of deference to Congress was most evident in the federalism decisions, where the Court invalidated laws as exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause, 40 narrowed the scope of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 revived the Tenth Amendment as a constraint on federal power, 42 and expanded the scope of sovereign immunity to limit the enforcement of federal statutes. 43 Nor was the Rehnquist Court during this time one that deferred to state legislatures; as Professor Merrill has noted, the Court frequently found state laws preempted by federal law during this time. 44 One would imagine that a Court committed to states' rights would narrow the preemptive scope of federal law, 45 45 As Professor Merrill observes, A true believer in states' rights presumably would want to see greater power devolve from the federal government to the states. Such a sincere federalist would not only support formal limits on congressional power and immunities for states from suits by private citizens grounded in federal law, but he or she would also want to interpret the preemptive effect of federal statutes narrowly, so as to leave as large an ambit of state regulatory authority as possible. Merrill, supra note 20, at 611; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 1313 ("One would expect that a Court concerned with federalism and states' rights also would be narrowing the scope of federal preemption of state laws.").
[Vol. 154: 1331 for the Rehnquist Court. 46 Also, the Court invalidated many state laws as violating the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and association. 47 Indeed, in cases striking down restrictions on speech by judicial candidates and ruling in favor of the Boy Scouts' ability to exclude gays despite a state law prohibiting such discrimination, the Court was split five to four with the five most conservative Justices ruling against the state law. Nor after Bush v. Gore 48 can it be credibly claimed that the five most conservative Justices always showed deference to state courts.
But in the last few years of its existence, the Rehnquist Court was decidedly more moderate. that a warrantless arrest is valid so long as there was probable cause at the time of the arrest, regardless of whether the offense was "closely related" to the offense the arresting officer identified as the reason for arrest). The only exception in the last two years was Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 551 (2004), which held that a warrant must specify with particularity that which is to be searched or seized.
[Vol. 154: 1331
Overall, then, in assessing the Rehnquist Court, Professor Merrill is correct in separating its differing phases. I, however, disagree with his description. In assessing the substantive success of William Rehnquist as a Chief Justice, an obvious conclusion emerges: Rehnquist was far more successful in the first two phases, from 1986 to 2002, than in the last phase. Both in his Court's initial deferential phase and in its subsequent more activist phase, Rehnquist was consistently in the majority in all of the areas described above. In fact, in every single case cited above from 1986 to 2002, Rehnquist was in the majority and wrote most of the majority opinions. But from 2002 to 2005, Rehnquist was hardly in the majority at all in any of the decisions coming to the more progressive results mentioned above.
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Of course, it is tempting to speculate as to why the shift in the Rehnquist Court occurred, especially as to the change in its last few years. After giving this great reflection, I do not have a persuasive answer. Ultimately, the answer may be a straightforward one: in the last few years of the Rehnquist Court, the more moderate group of Justices (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) were more successful in many key cases at getting either O'Connor or Kennedy than the most conservative Justices (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) were at getting both. This is an accurate account of the decisions, but it still does not explain why O'Connor and Kennedy were more likely to vote with the moderate group in the last few years than they were to do so prior to then.
II. THE THEMES OF THE REHNQUIST COURT
The prior section offered one way of looking at assessing the success of Chief Justice Rehnquist: temporally, by focusing on specific time periods. Another way of examining and assessing Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice is more thematic, looking at the specific doctrinal themes of the Rehnquist Court and considering the extent to which each reflects Rehnquist's views.
Although any examination is inherently incomplete, I identify six major themes of the Rehnquist Court and suggest that all very much reflect the views of its Chief Justice: (2) No new fundamental rights were recognized during the Rehnquist Court, and many already existing rights were narrowed.
(3) The protections accorded criminal defendants were significantly narrowed.
(4) The limits imposed on the government by the Establishment Clause were relaxed.
(5) Access to federal courts to hear civil rights claims was significantly limited.
(6) The powers of Congress were restricted for the first time in almost sixty years: new limits were imposed on Congress's commerce power and authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment was revived as a constraint on federal power, and state sovereign immunity was significantly expanded.
I list these together at the outset because this is a place where the whole is more than the sum of the parts; taken together, these themes show a Court that, overall, moved the law significantly to the right.
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Taken together, the themes show a Court that, overall, reflected the ideology and positions of its Chief Justice.
To explain, I will consider each of these six themes individually.
A. No New Suspect Classifications Were Found, and Remedies for Constitutional Violations Were Limited
At the inception of the Rehnquist Court in 1986, it was clearly established that strict scrutiny was used for discrimination based on race and national origin, 59 and also generally for discrimination against [Vol. 154: 1331 noncitizens. 60 Intermediate scrutiny was used under equal protection for gender discrimination 61 and for discrimination against non-marital children.
62 All other types of discrimination received only rational basis review under equal protection.
This did not change at all in the nineteen years of the Rehnquist Court. In fact, the only major case finding an equal protection violation outside of these areas-Romer v. Evans-expressly used rational basis review in declaring unconstitutional discrimination based on sexual orientation.
63
The most important victory by a plaintiff asserting an equal protection violation was Bush v. Gore, 64 in which Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the majority.
The Rehnquist Court consistently limited remedies for violations of civil rights. This was evident in the area of school desegregation. In Board of Education v. Dowell, the issue was whether a desegregation order should continue when its end would mean a resegregation of the public schools. 65 Oklahoma schools had been segregated under a state law mandating separation of the races.
66
A federal court order was successful in desegregating the Oklahoma City public schools. 67 Evidence proved that ending the desegregation order would result in resegregation. 68 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that once a "unitary" school system had been achieved, a federal court's desegre- 60 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (using strict scrutiny to invalidate a state law denying welfare benefits to noncitizens). But in some instances, only rational basis review is used for discrimination against non-citizens, such as where the alienage classification relates to self-government and the democratic process. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296-300 (1978) (upholding a statute preventing noncitizens from being police officers as meeting rational basis review The Court did not define "unitary system" with any specificity. It simply said that the desegregation decree should be ended if the board "ha[s] complied in good faith" and "the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable." 70 The Court said that in evaluating this, "the District Court should look not only at student assignments, but to every facet of school operationsfaculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities." In Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court held that a federal court desegregation order should end when it is complied with, even if other desegregation orders for the same school system remain in place.
72
A federal district court ordered desegregation of various aspects of a school system in Georgia that previously had been segregated by law.
73
Part of the desegregation plan had been met; the school system had achieved desegregation in pupil assignment and in facilities. 74 Another aspect of the desegregation order, concerning assignment of teachers, had not yet been fulfilled. 75 The Court said that once a portion of a desegregation order is met, the federal court should cease its efforts as to that part and remain involved only as to those aspects of the plan that have not been achieved. Missouri law once required the racial segregation of all public schools.
78
It was not until 1985 that a federal district court ordered the desegregation of the Kansas City, Missouri, public schools.
79
The federal court's desegregation effort made a difference. In 1983, twenty-four 69 Id. at 248-50. 70 Id. at 249-50. 71 Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted). 72 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992). 73 Id. 74 Id. at 474. 75 Id. at 481. 76 Id. at 491. 77 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995) . Earlier in the life of the case, the Supreme Court had ruled that a federal district court could order a local taxing body to increase taxes to pay for compliance with a desegregation order, although the federal court should not itself order an increase in the taxes. Missouri v. Jenkins ( Jenkins I ), 495 U.S. 33, 57-58 (1990).
78 Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 37. 79 Id. at 37-38.
[Vol. 154: 1331 schools in the district had an African American enrollment of 90% or more. 80 By 1993, no elementary-level student attended a school with an enrollment that was 90% or more African American. 81 At the middle school and high school levels, the percentage of students attending schools with an African American enrollment of 90% or more declined from about 45% to 22%. 82 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled in favor of the state on every issue. The Court ruled that the continued disparity in student test scores did not justify continuance of the federal court's desegregation order. 83 The Court concluded that the Constitution requires equal opportunity, not any particular result, and that therefore disparities between African American and white students on standardized tests were not a sufficient basis for concluding that desegregation had not been achieved. 84 The Supreme Court held that once a desegregation order is complied with in good faith, the federal court effort should end. 85 Disparity in test scores is not a basis for continued federal court involvement.
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These Rehnquist Court decisions have led to a large number of lower court cases ending desegregation orders. 87 The result has been the substantial resegregation of American public schools.
Harvard Professor Gary Orfield has shown that, nationally, the percentage of African American students attending majority black schools and schools where over 90% of the students are black also has 80 Jenkins II, 515 U.S. at 115 (Thomas, J., concurring). 81 increased in the last fifteen years. 88 In 1986-1987, 63.3% of black students attended schools that were comprised of 50% to 100% minority students; by 1998-1999, this composition had increased to 70.2%.
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In North Carolina, for example, the same pattern exists. Between 1993 and 2000, the number of black students attending schools with minority enrollments of 80% or more doubled. 90 In Charlotte, fewer than 60% of the schools meet the standard definition of "diverse"; this is down from 85% in the 1980s.
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A second way in which the Rehnquist Court has limited remedies for discrimination is by restricting affirmative action. The Rehnquist Court will be most remembered for its one decision upholding affirmative action: Grutter v. Bollinger. 92 Although this is an enormously important ruling, it must be remembered that this was the only Rehnquist Court decision upholding affirmative action. When Rehnquist became Chief Justice, the level of scrutiny to be used for racial classifications benefiting minorities was uncertain.
93
But the Rehnquist Court decisively adopted strict scrutiny review for affirmative action programs, concluding that benign racial classifications benefiting minorities should be treated in the same way as invidious ones disadvantaging racial minorities. 94 The Court repeatedly held that strict scrutiny review would be applied when the government used race as a factor in drawing election districts to benefit minorities. 
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Although Lawrence is an enormously important decision protecting individual rights, it is significant that Justice Kennedy's majority opinion did not use the language of fundamental rights or strict scrutiny.
As a result, lower courts have read the case as endorsing only rational basis review.
109
In many other areas, the Rehnquist Court significantly constricted individual rights compared to what they had been when Rehnquist became Chief in 1986. Rehnquist was in the majority in all of these areas. For example, in 1989, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court significantly limited the rights of unmarried fathers. 110 The Supreme Court held that even an unmarried father who participates actively in the child's life is not entitled to due process if the mother is married to someone else. 111 Specifically, the Supreme Court ruled that a state may create an irrebuttable presumption that a married woman's husband is the father of her child even though it negates all of the biological father's rights.
112
Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion.
Another particularly important example of the narrowing of constitutional protections was Employment Division v. Smith, which greatly limited the protections of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
113 Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion holding that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated by a neutral law of general applicability, no matter how much the law burdens religion.
114
Never before had the Court articulated this restrictive view of the Constitution's protections for free exercise of religion.
Thus, the overall record of the Rehnquist Court in following the views of the Chief Justice was more mixed with regard to fundamental rights than with regard to equal protection. No new fundamental rights were recognized and some existing rights were narrowed, but the Court did not go as far in this direction as Rehnquist urged.
C. The Protections Accorded Criminal Defendants
Were Significantly Narrowed
Another consistent feature of the Rehnquist Court has been its strong likelihood of ruling in favor of the government in criminal procedure cases. Generally, criminal defendants have lost before the Rehnquist Court in all three of its phases. Rehnquist has been in the majority in all of these efforts.
For example, the Court constantly has sought to narrow the availability of habeas corpus for prisoners. In 1989, in Teague v. Lane, the Court imposed a significant new limit on the availability of relief under habeas corpus: habeas petitions could be heard only if they relied on already existing constitutional principles, and "new rules" could be raised on habeas corpus only in the rare circumstances that they would apply retroactively. 115 In McCleskey v. Zant, the Court ruled that successive habeas petitions were not allowed unless the petitioner could demonstrate either cause and prejudice or actual innocence.
116
In 1996, Congress greatly restricted the availability of habeas corpus in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
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Since then, the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute expansively to limit habeas corpus. For example, in Tyler v. Cain, the Court held that a habeas petition cannot be heard, even if a person was clearly unconstitutionally convicted, unless the Supreme Court holds that its prior decision applies retroactively.
118
The Fourth Amendment is another area in which criminal defendants have lost throughout the Rehnquist Court. In 1989, for instance, the Court upheld drug-courier profiling Perhaps most dramatically, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court protected the right to trial by jury by holding that any factor, other than a prior conviction, that leads to a sentence greater than the statutory maximum must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. . 128 542 U.S. 297, 301 (2004) (applying the Apprendi rule that any factor, other than a prior conviction, that provides for a penalty greater than that which could be imposed based on the jury's verdict or what the defendant admitted, must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
129 543 U.S. 220, 233-34, 260-63 (2005) (applying the principles of Apprendi and Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, requiring the guidelines to be advisory, not mandatory, and holding that appellate review should be to determine whether a sentence is unreasonable).
There were other notable victories for criminal defendants, particularly during the third phase of the Rehnquist Court. In Crawford v. Washington, the Court changed the law, overruled precedent, and provided more protections under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by limiting hearsay testimony that could be used against criminal defendants.
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In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty for the mentally retarded.
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In a six-tothree decision, with Justice Stevens writing for the Court and Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas dissenting, the Court reaffirmed that "evolving standards of decency" are to be used to determine what is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 132 The Court looked to the trend among the states as well as international practice in determining "evolving standards of decency." 133 The Court pointed to the number of states that have eliminated the death penalty for crimes committed by the mentally retarded and how few foreign countries permit the practice.
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Quite importantly, the Court stressed that there is a significant risk of executing innocent individuals because those with mental disabilities are more likely to make false confessions and are less likely to be able to work with counsel. 135 In Roper v. Simmons, the Court ruled that it was cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles. 136 In the five-to-four decision, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 137 Once more, the Court rested its decision on the premise that "evolving standards of decency" are to be used to determine what is cruel and unusual punishment. The Court explained: "To implement this framework we have established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and un-[Vol. 154: 1331 usual."
138 As in Atkins, the Court again looked to the trend among the states and international practice in determining "evolving standards of decency." 139 Overall though, surely no one would disagree that the Rehnquist Court, throughout its existence, overwhelmingly has sided with the government and ruled against criminal defendants in criminal procedure cases. This is an area where the Supreme Court was generally quite in accord with the views of its Chief Justice.
D. The Limits Imposed on the Government by the Establishment Clause Were Relaxed
In important ways, this is an area where Chief Justice Rehnquist did not succeed; the Rehnquist Court did not go nearly as far as Rehnquist would have liked in changing the law regarding the Establishment Clause. Although Rehnquist clearly favored overruling the test for the Establishment Clause articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 140 there never were five votes in favor of this view.
141
Rehnquist's position-that the Establishment Clause is violated only if the government establishes a church, coerces religious participation, or favors some religions over others 142 -never was adopted by a majority of the Court. To be more specific, Rehnquist consistently dissented in cases limiting prayers in public schools. government aid to religious schools. In 1997, in Agostini v. Felton, the Court reversed a decade-old precedent and held that public school special education teachers may provide services in parochial schools. 144 In Mitchell v. Helms, decided in June 2000, the Court reversed two precedents and allowed the government to lend instructional equipment to parochial schools. 145 Two years later, in Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, the Court upheld a voucher program for the Cleveland schools even though 96% of the vouchers went to parochial schools. 146 In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court, five to four, concluded that this did not violate the Establishment Clause because all schools, including all religious schools, could receive money and because the government was acting with the permissible purpose of improving education for children. 147 Thus, with respect to the Establishment Clause, Rehnquist's success was more mixed. This, however, may be an area where Rehnquist's vision ultimately will triumph. If the two new JusticesJohn Roberts and Samuel Alito-take the Rehnquist approach, there will be five votes to overrule the Lemon test and bring about the dramatic change long sought by Rehnquist.
E. Access to Federal Courts to Hear Civil Rights Claims Was Significantly Limited
One of the most overlooked consequences of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence has been a significant restriction of access to the courthouse. In a series of cases interpreting federal civil rights statutes, the Court consistently has limited the ability of civil rights plaintiffs to sue. In every one of these cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the majority and almost all were decided five to four.
For example, in Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court held, five to four, that there is no private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
148
Title VI prevents recipients of federal money from discriminating based on race [Vol. 154: 1331 and from engaging in practices that have a racially discriminatory impact. 149 The importance of these regulations cannot be overstated. The Supreme Court has held that violations of the Equal Protection Clause and equal protection components of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment require proof of discriminatory purpose, which may be difficult to show.
150 Therefore, Title VI regulations are the key method of challenging actions that disadvantage racial minorities when discriminatory purpose cannot be proven. Since it is so difficult to prove discriminatory intent, Title VI has been an enormously important weapon in civil rights litigation.
151
But the Supreme Court's ruling in Alexander that no lawsuits can be brought under these regulations means that civil rights plaintiffs have lost a key weapon for challenging practices that have a racially discriminatory impact.
Notably, the Court, in Justice Scalia's majority opinion, did not invalidate the Title VI regulations. The Court did say, however, that their validity was an open question to be considered on another occasion. 152 Instead, the Court assumed the validity of the regulations and ruled that no lawsuits can be brought to enforce them. How, then, are the Title VI regulations to be enforced? They only can be enforced if the political branches of government are willing to cut off funds to recipients who engage in practices with a racially disparate impact. Once more, the Court has denied access to the judiciary and left enforcement of civil rights to the political branches of government.
Another example of the Court's restriction of access to the judiciary is the imposition of limits on the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce other federal civil rights laws. Some federal civil rights laws, like other federal statutes, do not authorize a private right of action. Section 1983 is the crucial vehicle for enforcement of these laws in courts.
153 But in Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court held that the provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act that restrict educational institutions from releasing information about their students cannot be enforced through a private right of action as a § 1983 149 See id. at 279-81 (describing aspects of Title VI that "must be taken as given" suit. 154 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that since the law was adopted by Congress under its spending power and did not unambiguously confer individual rights, it could not be enforced through litigation. 155 As in Alexander, compliance will depend on the willingness of the political branches to enforce the law's requirements by cutting off funds to offending institutions. The unquestionable value of litigation in deterring violations and providing a remedy to victims was never recognized by the Court.
Yet another example of the closing of the courthouse doors has been the aggressive enforcement of arbitration clauses. There has been an important trend in recent years towards businesses insisting on arbitration clauses in contracts. This is common in many areas, such as employment and health care. Frequently, these clauses are written in broad terms and leave the other party to the contract no alternative but to forego access to the courts.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams involved an employee of a Circuit City store in California who sued the company in state court under state antidiscrimination laws. 156 His employment application included a clause providing for arbitration of employment-related disputes. 157 Circuit City filed a lawsuit in federal district court, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925, 158 to compel arbitration.
159
The FAA has an exception for maritime and other employment contracts in interstate commerce. 160 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, ruled that the state law discrimination claims had to go to arbitration and could not be litigated in court. 161 The Court broadly construed the FAA and narrowly interpreted its exception to apply only to "employment of transportation workers." 162 The Court did not discuss, or even acknowledge, the compelling public purpose of allowing victims of discrimination to have access to the courts.
The above techniques of closing the courthouse door have involved the Supreme Court directly precluding all access by civil rights plaintiffs. The Court also ruled against civil rights plaintiffs by eliminating incentives to litigate and creating obstacles which are disincentives to suits.
The 164 The availability of attorneys' fees under civil rights statutes is a major incentive for suits. The reality is that without this incentive, it would be far more difficult to enforce civil rights laws. Buckhannon involved a challenge to state regulations under several federal statutes, including the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
165
There was protracted litigation and ultimately the state voluntarily changed its policy and adopted what the plaintiffs had been seeking through their suit. 166 The plaintiffs then sought attorneys' fees on the grounds that they had been the catalyst for the changes. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, rejected their position and held that a plaintiff is not deemed to "prevail" just because her lawsuit is the "catalyst" for the government to change its policy. 167 Attorneys' fees are to be awarded only when there is a judicial action-a judgment or consent decree-in favor of the plaintiff. 168 The result is that a defendant can preclude a deserving plaintiff from recovering attorneys' fees simply by changing policies before a verdict. Reducing the chances of attorneys' fees in this way will often remove a crucial incentive to litigate and effectively close the courthouse door in many civil rights cases. bringing a discrimination claim on behalf of an individual. The Court explained that an individual, via an arbitration clause, waives her right to sue, but the person cannot waive the government's authority to bring an enforcement action. Id. at 286-88. This is a significant ruling, but it does relatively little to undercut the effect of Circuit City. The EEOC's ability to sue on behalf of individuals is inherently limited by scarce resources. The vast majority of employees with arbitration clauses in their contracts will not have any meaningful access to the courts when they are subjected to discrimination. 164 532 U.S. 598, 605-06 (2001). 165 Id. at 601. 166 Id. 167 Id. at 605-06. 168 Id. at 603.
Cumulatively, these decisions make it much harder for civil rights plaintiffs to be heard in federal court or to gain relief. Since Rehnquist was in the majority of all of these cases and wrote several of the opinions, there is no doubt that the Court was in accord with his substantive vision. I have no doubt that when constitutional historians look back at the Rehnquist Court, they will say that its greatest changes in constitutional law were in the area of federalism. Especially here, there is no doubt that Rehnquist had a definite substantive vision, and the Rehnquist Court, except in the last few years, acted in accordance with his views.
In the first third of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court used concern over states' rights and federalism as the basis for limiting the scope of Congress's commerce power and also held that the Tenth Amendment reserves a zone of activities for exclusive state control. For example, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court struck down a federal law prohibiting child labor on the ground that it violated the Tenth Amendment. 169 After 1937, however, the Court rejected this view and no longer saw the Tenth Amendment as a limit on federal power; it was just a reminder that Congress could not act unless there was express or implied constitutional authority.
170
In 1976, the Court appeared to revive federalism as a limit on congressional powers in National League of Cities v. Usery, in which the Court invalidated a federal law that required state and local governments to pay their employees a minimum wage. 171 The Court, in an opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist, held that Congress could not regulate states in areas of "traditional" or "integral" state responsibility.
172
This was a dramatic decision, as it was the first instance of the Supreme Court striking a law down on federalism grounds in forty years. 169 241 U.S. 251, 274, 276-77 (1918) ("The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not intended to destroy the local power always reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution."). 170 [Vol. 154: 1331
Rehnquist's strong support for states' rights, especially as a limit on federal power, was noted before he became Chief Justice.
173 Only after he became Chief Justice, however, was Rehnquist's vision realized. Nine years after National League of Cities was decided, it was expressly overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 174 Justice Rehnquist, in a short dissent, said that he believed that his view would again triumph on the Court. 175 Subsequently, after he became Chief Justice, the Court endorsed Rehnquist's views and revived the Tenth Amendment as a constraint on Congress's authority. In New York v. United States, the Court-for only the second time in fifty-five years and the first time since the overruled National League of Cities decision-invalidated a federal law as violating the Tenth Amendment.
176
A federal law, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, created a statutory duty for states to provide for the safe disposal of radioactive wastes generated within their borders. 177 In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that forcing states to accept ownership of radioactive wastes would impermissibly "commandeer" state governments. 178 The Court concluded that it was "clear" that because of the Tenth Amendment, " [t] he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." 180 Printz involved a challenge to the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993. 181 The law required that the "chief law enforcement officer" of each local jurisdiction conduct background checks before issuing permits for fire-arms. 182 The Court, in a five-to-four decision, found that the law violated the Tenth Amendment.
183
The Rehnquist Court revived federalism as a limit on Congress's powers in another way: It restricted the scope of Congress's commerce power. In United States v. Lopez, 184 the Supreme Court, with the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, declared unconstitutional the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, a federal law that made it a crime to have a firearm within one thousand feet of a school. 185 In United States v. Morrison, 186 the Court followed Lopez and declared unconstitutional the civil damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. 187 The provision created a federal cause of action for victims of gender-motivated violence. In enacting the Violence Against Women Act, Congress held lengthy hearings and found that gender-motivated violence cost the American economy billions of dollars a year. 188 Most importantly, Congress found that state courts often insufficiently dealt with violence against women. 189 But the Supreme Court nonetheless invalidated the law in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 190 [Vol. 154: 1331 1967. 193 In Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled that state governments may not be sued for employment discrimination in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 194 In each case, the Court, in a five-tofour decision, concluded that Congress was expanding the scope of rights and that the laws could not be justified as narrowly tailored to preventing or remedying constitutional violations.
195
The Court also expanded the situations in which sovereign immunity could be asserted. In another five-to-four decision, Alden v. Maine, the Court held that sovereign immunity protects state governments from being sued in state court without their consent, even to enforce federal laws.
196
At oral argument in Alden, Solicitor General Seth Waxman quoted to the Court from the Supremacy Clause of Article VI and contended that suits against states are essential to assure the supremacy of federal law.
197 Justice Kennedy's response to this argument in the Alden opinion is enormously revealing of the Rehnquist Court's attitude towards federalism. He stated:
The constitutional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign immunity in its own courts does not confer upon the State a concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law. The States and their officers are bound by obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal statutes that comport with the constitutional design. We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States. The good faith of the States thus provides an important assurance that " [t] his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Interestingly, the most recent federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court were in favor of federal power. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court allowed suits against states for violations of the family leave provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.
199
Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the majority in the six-to-three decision. In Tennessee v. Lane, the Court held that states may be sued pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 for discriminating against people with disabilities with regard to access to the courts. 200 Here, Rehnquist dissented in a fiveto-four decision. Finally, in his last Term, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court, over Rehnquist's dissent, upheld the constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting cultivation and possession of small amounts of marijuana for medicinal purposes. 201 Rehnquist wrote the opinion in Hibbs, but dissented in Lane and Raich.
Overall, the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions are a dramatic departure in the law from what it was before William Rehnquist became Chief Justice. In every case limiting federal power, Rehnquist was in the majority, and in many he wrote the Court's decision. The only deviation was in the third phase of the Rehnquist Court described above. But there can be little dispute that federalism was one of Rehnquist's great triumphs in bringing his conservative vision to constitutional doctrine.
CONCLUSION
There are many ways in which a Chief Justice can influence the substantive decision making of the Court. The Chief plays a key role in leading the conferences that determine which cases will be heard. The Chief leads the discussions at conferences where the cases are decided. The Chief assigns the majority opinion when in the majority, and this often can be important in keeping the majority. In all of these ways, and others, a Chief can have a significant effect on the decisions. All of these forms of influence are invisible outside the Court, except by looking at the results and the decisions themselves.
Yet, it is possible to assess the success of a Chief Justice by looking at whether that individual's views were followed by the Court. My conclusion is that William Rehnquist was a tremendously successful Chief Justice, especially in his first sixteen years as Chief, in having his
